Psychology Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Kripke's Wittgenstein: Interpretation by Saul A. Kripke of a problem by L. Wittgenstein in connection with the rule series. Kripke extends Wittgenstein's doubts about the security with which we judge our own opinion. If we only believe to follow rules, we do not know for sure what we mean by addition. From a finite series of cases in the past, no certainty about future cases can be gained. The core of the problem is, according to Kripke, that there are no facts that determine the importance of our own beliefs._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Stanley Cavell on Kripke’s Wittgenstein - Dictionary of Arguments
I 216 Kripke's Wittgenstein: nothing can be meant, because no rule and no presence controls the meaning of words - there is no fact, due to which a word means something. Solution: Implementation of socially controlled assertibility conditions. >Rules, >Rule following, >Assertibility. I 216 Kripke's Wittgenstein/Cavell: skeptical paradox: nothing, no rule, no present can control the meaning of my words. This is the end of the possibility of meaning something at all. Solution: Introduction of socially sanctioned assertibility conditions. >Meaning(Intending), >Assertions, >Meaning, >Intention, >Nonfactualism, >Facts. Kripke: Main point: the absence of meaning-imparting facts. CavellVsKripke: 1. probably Wittgenstein himself did not see the paradox like this. He would also not ask for such facts as to guarantee the meaning and which should be more stable than our practice. >Language use. I 217 CavellVsKripke: 2. Kripke goes unintentionally from "inclined to" to "be entitled to" about: Wittgenstein: "If I have exhausted the reasoning, I am inclined to say .." Kripke (unlike Wittgenstein) seems to believe that agreement is something like a contract. I 218 Its solution is more skeptical than the problem that is to solve it. --- I (c) 220 Kripke's Wittgenstein/Cavell: for Kripke, rules are more fundamental than criteria for Wittgenstein's skepticism against meanings. >Criteria. CavellVsKripke: the problem of the ordinary remains underexposed. I (c) 221 For me, the rules are subordinated to the criteria. I (c) 233 Kripke's Wittgenstein/CavellVsKripke: Solution: it is about whether the newcomer accepts what Emerson calls conformism, or not. It is about the permanent crisis of a society that believes itself to be based on consensus. When the child is marginalized as crazy, it is both the power of a society and its powerlessness. I (c) 243 Kripke's Wittgenstein/CavellVsKripke: I do not think his reading is wrong, I doubt his need. If so, the problem needs to be redesigned. >Private Language, >Rule Following._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Cavell I St. Cavell Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen Frankfurt 2002 Cavell I (a) Stanley Cavell "Knowing and Acknowledging" in: St. Cavell, Must We Mean What We Say?, Cambridge 1976, pp. 238-266 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Stanley Cavell, Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell I (b) Stanley Cavell "Excursus on Wittgenstein’s Vision of Language", in: St. Cavell, The Claim of Reason, Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy, New York 1979, pp. 168-190 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Stanley Cavell, Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell I (c) Stanley Cavell "The Argument of the Ordinary, Scenes of Instruction in Wittgenstein and in Kripke", in: St. Cavell, Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome: The Constitution of Emersonian Perfectionism, Chicago 1990, pp. 64-100 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Davide Sparti/Espen Hammer (eds.), Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell II Stanley Cavell "Must we mean what we say?" in: Inquiry 1 (1958) In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
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> Counter arguments against Cavell
> Counter arguments in relation to Kripke’s Wittgenstein
